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THE PERSON AS SIGNATORY: CONTRACTARIAN SOCIAL 
THEORY AT WORK IN SUBURBIA 
Michael J Monahan 
Political life can be understood as a manifestation of compet-
ing notions of what it means to be human. In other words, a polit-
ical point of view can be understood as an implicit understanding 
of what separates human beings, as political agents, from non-
political forms of life (which may include all or some animals, or 
even in some cases homo sapiens who lack certain mental and/or 
moral capacities) or mere objects. A given political view will also 
have something to say about the relationship between particular 
political agents, and the relation between humanity, in this nor-
mative sense, and non-humans. I would like to look closely at 
what I take to be the dominant understanding of "the human"-
namely "contractarian" conceptions of social/politicallife-pay-
ing special attention to the symbolic representation of this under-
standing. 
In referring to social theories and ways of interacting as "con-
tractarian", I mean to capture a general belief or set of beliefs, 
rather than any particular philosophical theory. Specifically, I 
take any understanding of social interaction which uses an ex-
change of "goods" (material goods and/or "non-material goods") 
as the principal model of social/political explanation and analy-
sis to be "contractarian" in this sense. This view finds its clearest 
expressIon, peraaps, ill Cae economze context; me dOm/Rdn.t 
economic thinking, which stands in the tradition of Adam 
~mitb\, provines a view in wn1.cn one 1.'1> an ec()n()ln.\C a,gent \() fue 
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extent that one is able to engage in the exchange of goods and 
services generally.2 Smith's description of the human "propensity 
to truck, barter, and exchange one thing for another"3 is first and 
foremost a description of a contractual interaction in the very 
sense understood by Thomas Hobbes.4 Outside the realm of 
"pure" economics, this exchange of goods may become some-
what more abstract, we may speak of exchanging "rights" for "secu-
rity," or the distribution of "opportunity," but the basic model 
remains intact whether one is performing a market analysis or 
justifYing a legal sanction. Human interaction, according to this 
way of thinking, can always be understood in terms of an ex-
change of goods, and questions of justice are largely, if not sole-
ly, a matter of the distribution of those goods and the contracts 
(implicit or explicit) which govern that distribution. Thus, this 
weaker, more general definition of "contractarian" would apply 
not only to "social contract theorists" from Hobbes and Locke 
through Rawls and Gauthier, but also to much of the received 
opinion regarding human social interaction both in academia 
generally, and in more mainstream "popular" discourse. 
Having conquered the realms of economic, legal, and political 
theory (or at least the "legitimate" varieties of these theories), the 
social contract is forging into the more mundane territory of 
basic human interaction on the immediate level of the relations 
between family and friends. In other words, "the contract" has 
become the dominant symbolic tool by which we make sense of 
our relationship to the larger polity, to other individuals, and ulti-
mately to ourselves. "Persons" are being replaced by "signato-
ries". I will explore the effects of this symbol for human interac-
tion by looking closely at a particular example-that of the 
"Home Owners Association". By drawing out the implications of 
this phenomenon, and appealing to the critique of this view of 
human interaction offered in Hegel's Philosophy of Right, I will 
argue that the notion of the contract is an impoverished way to 
symbolically capture human relations, and ultimately serves not 
only to cripple our understanding of those relations, but also 
leads to a similarly impoverished understanding of self and 
agency. 
The advent of the "Home-Owners Association" (HOA) can be 
seen as paradigmatic of the rise of contractarian representations 
of humanity. An HOA is an institution designed primarily to pro-
tect the property value of a corresponding housing development. 
The centerpiece for any given HOA is its body of Codes, Cove-
nants, and Restrictions (CC&R's), which is a set of rules and reg-
The Person as Signatory/1 17 
ulations governing the home-owner's use of his/her property. 
The CC&R's dictate the types of landscaping one my use, where 
one may park one's vehicles, the colors of paint one may use on 
one's exterior, and so on. Membership in the HOA is mandatory 
upon the purchase of a home within the area governed by that 
HOA, and a monthly membership fee is assessed. The fee covers 
the administrative costs of the association, as well as the upkeep 
of common areas within the "community". The Association is 
o..d.m~\\i~texe.d. b'J 0.. committee elected by the membershi\l, and 
regular meetings are held to decide the allocation of resources 
and assess penalties for violation of the CC&R's. Often an HOA 
will in turn be part of a larger HOA. In Las Vegas, Nevada, for 
example, the large "master-planned community" of Summerlin 
has three main HOA's, each one consisting of dozens of smaller 
individual HOA's. Once one has purchased a home within one of 
these communities, and thereby joined one or more HOA's, one 
is bound by the CC&R's of the appropriate HOA's. Failure to 
abide by the CC&R's can result in substantial fees, and failure to 
pay the assigned fees can result in a lien being placed upon one's 
property. The political and economic ramifications of this phe-
nomenon are significant and worthy of exploration,5 but the pres-
ent concern is with the ways in which HOA's make implicit as-
sumptions and characterizations of what it means to be human. 
In other words, how does the HOA affect the individual's expe-
rience of her relation to her fellow members, to non-members, 
and ultimately to herself? Or, put yet differently, how does the 
HOA alter her consciousness of the humanity of those around her 
as well as her own? The question, then, is ultimately one of a phe-
nomenology of the HOA. Phenomenology, as the term is being em-
ployed here, can best be understood as "reflective thought upon 
what can be called objects of thought ... or, better yet, objects of 
consciousness."6 The task, then, is to reflect upon the way in 
which one's consciousness of one's place in the social world is 
influenced by membership in an HOA. The specific example pro-
vided below should be understood as only the most general char-
acterization of HOA's.7 Surely these particular examples are not 
common to all individual HOA's. The basic structure and content 
of the rules governing home-owners is very nearly universal, but 
the strictness of their enforcement varies (this variation in en-
forcement actually can serve to strengthen some of my criticism, 
as will become evident below). The generality of my use of exam-
ples does not pose an immediate problem, however. As men-
tioned above, the primary focus of this project of reflection will 
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be the way in which our understanding of the human comes to 
be mediated by the symbolic schema of the contract, and this basic 
schema remains intact regardless of the variations in enforce-
ment. 
One of the primary experiences upon entering an HOA-gov-
erned area (the common word for this is a "community," but for 
reasons which will become apparent later, I will refrain from 
using this term) is that of isolation. If we look at any typical sub-
urb, we will see a collection of discreet, self-contained units. Indi-
vidual, single-family dwellings, separated by some amount (how-
ever small) of yard, and usually a fence. Pair this with individual 
vehicular transportation, and the lack of a central cultural or 
community meeting place, and there is little reason or even op-
portunity for people to interact. Still, children will often meet 
each other (usually at school) and begin to form connections be-
tween households, which can start to enable home-owners to 
develop relationships with those who live near them. The geog-
raphy of the suburb supports a strong sense of isolation, but 
through the mediation of children, this experience is occasional-
lyovercome. 
Once we add an HOA to this context, however, things change. 
The document which governs the HOA, the CC&R's, usually has 
clear rules regulating the levels of noise and the kinds of activity, 
that can take place within sight of other members of the HOA. 
Some of the most frequent complaints (and any given complaint 
can, and often does, ultimately lead to a fine) result from the 
activities of children. What is more, the complaint is always 
lodged against the owner of the house at which the violation of 
the CC&R's takes place. Thus, it is not in any given home-owner's 
interests to have children anywhere near the house, and certain-
ly not in significant numbers. If home-owner A's children violate 
the CC&R's at home-owner B's house, then B will be cited for the 
violation. To be sure, children might congregate in small num-
bers, provided they remain indoors, but this provides little oppor-
tunity for the kinds of interaction required to establish connec-
tion between parents, and so any relationship between home-
owners remains vicarious at best. 
Indeed, not only is the gathering of children discouraged by 
the typical HOA, but any kind of public display of human activi-
ty (with the exception of yard-workS) can be a cause for com-
plaint, and a possible violation of the CC&R's. By way of example, 
a family moved into a home governed by an HOA in Las Vegas. 
This family had the habit of spending their evenings sitting in the 
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front yard. Many of us from small towns are familiar with this 
practice. It is a way to make oneself available to see passersby and 
be seen by them-it is in many ways an invitation to interact with 
others. Within a month, a half-dozen different complaints had 
been lodged against this family, and at the next general meeting, 
they were held in violation of the CC&R'S.9 They were, in effect, 
forbidden to sit in their front yard. What this points to is the fact 
that members of an HOA are often effectively compelled to shut 
themselves away in their homes out of the sight of those who live 
near them. There is indeed a concerted effort to remove, as 
much as possible, any evidence of human occupancy. In many 
CC&R's, it is forbidden to park in one's driveway, and certainly 
not allowed to park in the street. One's car is kept in one's ga-
rage, the door of which must be kept closed. Thus, it is possible 
for one to come and go from one's house without ever having to 
be directly visible to others. 
All of this adds up to an effort to enforce a kind of isolation 
upon the individual home-owners. The implicit goal of the 
CC&R's is to limit interaction between home owners outside of 
general meetings, at which time all interaction is mediated direct-
ly by the HOA contract. Thus, the implied ideal state is one in 
which each individual member experiences his or her home-life 
as if he or she were the only person living in the area. lo Ideally, 
one should be able to glimpse one's neighbors within a given 
week only rarely, and never be compelled actually to interact with 
them. At the same time that one is compelled to keep, as much 
as possible, to oneself, one is also encouraged to keep an eye out 
for infractions committed by others. The CC&R's, after all, are 
designed to preserve property values and maintain the beauty 
and order of the area, and so it is important that each member 
report violations of the CC&R's such that the appropriate steps 
may be taken. Thus, each member finds him or herself in a rather 
ironic position. He or she is encouraged to attend, as much as 
possible, to the activities of his or her neighbors so as to preserve 
the general sense of isolation of all members. In other words, one 
watches others closely, so that nothing occurs which might jeop-
ardize one's sense of being alone. One watches so as to ensure 
that no one is seen. 
This focus upon isolation is directly linked to the way in which 
contractual mediation of human relations operates. It is part of 
the logic of the contract that each signatory operates as an atom-
istic individual in the pursuit of his or her self-interest. At the 
foundation of any contractarian social interaction is a thorough-
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going ontological atomism. Indeed, were it not for this funda-
mental atomism, there would be no need for a contract to bind 
us together in the first place. In the case of the HOA, we see this 
ontology taken to its logical conclusion. By viewing ones rela-
tionship with others in terms of a contract, one finds oneself en-
meshed in a system of rules and expectations which encourages 
one to live this underlying atomism to the fullest. Yet in order to 
best achieve and maintain this isolation we must enter into a con-
tract designed for that purpose-our isolation requires a certain 
(admittedly limited) degree of interaction. Once again, a strong 
sense of irony emerges. In order even to approximate our ideals 
of individualism, we must interact with others not only initially, 
but constantly. 
What is particularly curious about this interaction is that it is 
always seeking to disguise itself from its participants. There is in-
teraction, but it is always at a distance, highly mediated, and dif-
fuse. One receives a "friendly reminder" in the mail regarding 
the length of one's grass. Failure to comply with this reminder re-
sults in the receipt of a notification of violation of the CC&R's. 
Even if one brings this matter before a meeting of the board, the 
interaction presents itself as occurring between the home-owner 
and the contract of the CC&R's, rather than between the home-
owner and his or her neighbors. Legitimate appeal may only be 
made to "the rules," whether or not they were broken, and what 
the appropriate punishment ought to be if they were. In other 
words, the interaction required to maintain the sense of isolation 
preserved by the CC&R's is always cloaked in the language and 
symbolism of the contract, such that it appears to the participants 
as anything but actual interaction in any meaningful sense of the 
term. There is no attempt to understand the position of one's 
interlocutors, no appeal to empathy or sympathy. Indeed, such 
appeals and attempts violate the spirit, if not the letter, of the 
con tract, by generating an atmosphere of "prejudice" or "bias." 
Thus, while interaction takes place, and remains necessary for 
the preservation of individualism, that interaction is mediated by 
the contract in such a way as to obfuscate much of its underlying 
significance. 
At the same time, this effort on the part of the CC&R's to keep 
the various home-owners out of sight takes the form of a kind of 
enforced homogeneity. Bearing in mind that all landscaping and 
home-improvements are strictly controlled by the CC&R's in 
order to secure the "beauty" of the area and thereby maintain 
and increase property value, we find that the result is a marked 
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similarity between one house and another. Lawns must be uni-
formly green,!! satellite dishes must be tucked discreetly into cor-
ners, and so on. No changes may be made which will make a par-
ticular property "stand out" from the others. In short, any thing 
which significantly individuates a given house is strictly discour-
aged. The aesthetic underlying the sense of "property value" be-
ing here protected is one which is fundamentally characterized 
by uniformity. 
This points to yet another irony. In the context of the effort to 
preserve the integrity of the individual from incursion from what 
is understood as external, it comes about that the individual, as a 
particular social agent, all but disappears. Within the atomistic 
understanding of agency underlying the contractual schema, the 
presence of property which "stands out" in some way is under-
stood as a threat to the stability of one's status as an individual. 
Since property which distinguishes itself in this way forces one to 
confront the presence of another agent (since the property 
stands as a kind of vicarious reflection of the personality of the 
owner), and that other agent is understood as fundamentally 
external, then the presence of the offending property becomes a 
literal incursion into the sanctity of one's private realm. Regard-
less of the aesthetic merits of a given individuating feature, it 
must be an "eyesore" inasmuch as it is a threat to the isolated 
individualism of the other home-owners. Thus one finds that the 
pursuit of individual integrity (individualism) ultimately erases 
one's individuality. A kind of strong homogeneity results, in 
which each individual is more or less secure in his or her prop-
erty, provided of course that individual does nothing which sets 
him or her apart from others. 
This is one point at which the aforementioned variations in the 
strictness of enforcement of the CC&R's can become an impor-
tant issue. There exist, to be sure, some HOA-governed areas 
which are hardly different from any "normal" suburb. This is usu-
ally a resul t of very lax enforcement of the existing CC&R's. How-
ever, regardless of whether in fact they are being enforced, that 
the rules remain intact, though dormant, is nevertheless impor-
tant. This means that at any time they can be brought out and 
employed against those who are understood as a threat to the 
property value of the "community." This point can be best illu-
minated through appeal to race. Historically, it was possible, until 
very recently, to place racially restrictive "covenants" (which were 
frequently supported by the Federal Housing Authority) upon 
property which prevented that property from being sold to non-
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whites (including, of ten, Jews).12 While these kinds of explicit re-
strictions are no longer legal, there remain more subtle ways to 
maintain de facto racial segregation. Beyond the "invisible hand" 
of market forces, which go a long way toward maintaining segre-
gation of housing, there are more direct instruments such as 
CC&R's. Even in HOA's where the CC&R's remain largely un-
enforced, if a new home-owner appears to his or her neighbors 
to be "suspicious," "unreliable," "shiftless," or even "dangerous," 
that that new home-owner will be the object of disproportionate 
scrutiny. Rules and restrictions which may have been historically 
dormant may be employed to neutralize the new "threat" to the 
security and property value of the neighborhood. Thus, even 
though there are variations in the enforcement of the CC&R's, 
there is a sense in which, given the prevailing dominance of racist 
understandings of who counts as a "desirable" neighbor,l~ and the 
underlying drive toward homogeneity (purity) within the "com-
munity," even the less-strict HOA's serve to support this under-
lying atomism-one's status as an isolated individual is protected 
so long as one conforms to behavioral (and racial) norms. 
All of these effects upon the behavior and experiences of the 
membership brought about by an HOA engenders a fundamen-
tal shift in the relations between individuals not only within the 
area governed by the CC&R's, but also between those individuals 
and the "outside" world. One's relation to other members of the 
HOA is above all mediated by and interpreted according to the 
"contract" which constitutes HOA membership. One may cer-
tainly take an interest in the behavior of fellow HOA members, 
but only in terms of the extent to which they successfully uphold 
the terms of the contract (obey the CC&R's). In fact, if one is to 
be a more or less ideal signatory, one should endeavor to avoid 
coming to know other members in too great a degree of intima-
cy, for this might cause one to show favoritism or bias in the 
enforcement of the CC&R's. As already discussed, members are 
related strictly by means of the HOA contract, and any familiari-
ty above and beyond this formal level stands as a threat to the 
integrity of that contract. The isolation of the agent, therefore, 
goes beyond the purely geographic and becomes an implicit 
restraint upon the formation of anything beyond the most casu-
al of relationships with fellow HOA members. 
Lastly, though certainly not least in import or significance, the 
HOA greatly influences and conditions the way in which individ-
ual members come to understand themselves as agents. Primarily, 
it serves to reinforce the understanding of oneself as an isolated 
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individual unit which happens to share loose, and purely formal, 
bonds with other similar atomistic units. Of course, since the con-
tract serves primarily to protect this isolation, any attempt to tran-
scend this assumed atomism must be understood as at least sus-
pect, if not explicitly hostile. As mentioned above, most of one's 
interaction with other members takes place either by means of 
surveillance to ensure the enforcement of the CC&R's, or at the 
regular general meetings, at which time one is typically judging 
the guilt of others, or defending oneself against the accusations 
of others. This quickly fosters an atmosphere of suspicion among 
the membership such that any attempt to transcend this basic 
contractual relationship is typically understood to be either an 
attempt to uncover hidden violations on the one hand, or to 
overlook particular violations on the other. Ultimately, however, 
the individual member is urged to understand herself as alone in 
the world, surrounded by similarly lone agents who are indiffer-
ent to one's well-being at best, or downright hostile at worst. The 
primary goal must then be to secure one's own position as much 
as possible on the one hand, and weaken the position of those 
who stand to do one harm on the other. The sole outlet for "polit-
ical" agency is by means of the contract, and the primary goal of 
the contract is the preservation of individualism. The HOA thus 
generates a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy. In assuming isolated, 
atomistic, radically self-interested political agents, the HOA con-
tract produces rules which foster an attitude of atomism, isola-
tion, and self-interest. 
One way to illustrate this shift in the relationship between 
members is by looking more closely at the term "neighbor." On 
the one hand, there is a kind of descriptive, geographical sense 
of the term, which connotes nothing more than a certain prox-
imity of domicile. One's "neighbors" in this sense are simply 
those who live within a certain area, and in this way one may have 
neighbors whom one has never seen or met. Without doubt, the 
members of an HOA are neighbors in this sense. Yet on the other 
hand, there is also a prescriptive, normative sense of the term, 
which connotes a certain interest in the well being of others, or 
at least a mutual respect or regard. Indeed, the concept of 
"neighborly" behavior makes little, if any, sense in the purely de-
scriptive context, and refers explicitly to the idea that there is 
some norm for behavior between neighbors which transcends 
simple spatial-relations. "Good neighbors" will lend cups of sugar 
or power tools, will collect the mail while one is away, and gener-
ally make gestures of good will and congeniality. Within the con-
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text of an HOA, it may be said that one's neighbors in the descrip-
tive sense, are seldom neighbors in the normative sense. 
Think, for example, of the way in which disputes might be set-
tled among neighbors in the normative sense of the term. The 
"good" neighbor does not respond to disputes by immediately 
phoning the police, or writing his/her congress member, or 
pouring sugar in the offender's gas tank. To do so would indeed 
be taken as a demonstration of one's "badness" as a neighbor. 
Rather, what is expected is that the neighbor will raise his/her 
complaint with the offender in order to reach some sort of ami-
cable accommodation. If the offender is also a "good" neighbor, 
then he/she will likewise attempt to reach an agreement. Again, 
if the offender instead simply walks away, or slams the door, or 
produces a firearm, this would be understood as the behavior of 
a "bad" neighbor. In short, the effort to resolve the conflict, pro-
vided both parties are "good" neighbors, will be cooperative, in 
the sense that each must come to some better understanding of 
the position of the other, and work to find some way to best ac-
commodate both of their interests. Thus, in order for this effort 
to succeed, each party must in some way become more familiar 
with the habits and interests of the other-the neighbor has to 
become more well known as a person. 
This points toward an important shift in the symbolic represen-
tation of our relation to others. The idea of the "neighbor," in 
the normative sense of the term, suggests a way of interacting 
with others which required at least a tentative move beyond the 
abstract notion of a bearer of rights and toward an understand-
ing of the other as a fully-fledged individual agent, whose interests 
and goals one ought to respect not because of any kind of con-
tractual agreement, but rather because one has come to recognize 
the importance and integrity of that agent as such. One comes to 
see the way in which one's neighbors, inasmuch as they are all sit-
uated in the same social context, are at the same time reflections 
of and conditioning factors in one's own status as a neighbor. 
Our shared interests are not the result of some formal or infor-
mal contract, but rather a matter of this shared social context 
which generates and conditions our interests in the same way that 
it conditions and renders possible our ability to individuate our-
selves. 
What, then, is one to make of the phenomenon of the HOA? 
Given the effective hegemony of contractarian understandings of 
social life it exemplifies, and the degree to which this dominance 
has been increasing in recent years, it is worthwhile to take a seri-
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ous look at its implicit assumptions, and its possible strengths and 
weaknesses. Hegel is a particularly fruitful figure with whom to 
take up this endeavor, for several reasons. First, his views influ-
ence, or at least lurk in the background, of many subsequent cri-
tiques,14 and so a clear understanding of Hegel can be critical to 
any fruitful employment of those more recent critiques. Second, 
he is not simply dismissive of contractarian views, but places them 
in a larger context which highlights their weaknesses, to be sure, 
but also their strengths. Lastly, his analysis of contractarian social 
theory is situated in an attempt to shed light upon the under-
standing of what it means to be a human agent, and how we might 
achieve a full and robust expression of that humanity. In the in-
terests of brevity, I will limit my exegesis to the discussion of those 
ways of thinking I have labeled "contractarian" offered in the Phi-
losophy of Right-specifically, I will focus upon Hegel's critique of 
the notions of self and freedom which lie at the heart of contract-
based conceptions of humanity and human interaction.15 
The bulk of Hegel's discussion of contract takes place in the 
"Abstract Right" section of the Philosophy of Right. The abstract-
ness of right referenced here lies in the fact that in this moment 
of the dialectic, the understanding of the human agent, and so-
cial interaction, is more or less "formal", in the sense that an 
attempt is made to reduce the political agent to a "universal" 
abstraction, as opposed to a "particular" and concrete individ-
ual. 16 That is, the agent is conceived of as being a self-contained, 
immediately given social unit which is "abstracted" from every 
"contingent" feature by which we normally distinguish between 
particular individuals. One's status as a political agent is given 
prior to any concrete details about that person's life. Indeed, a 
standard claim ofliberal political theory is that such "contingent" 
details about a person's life are, or at least ought to be, political-
ly irrelevant. This is in many ways the entire point of Rawls' "veil 
of ignorance," which invites us to abstract from the world of the 
here and now, and posit ourselves as more or less featureless 
political units. Hobbes' state of nature serves much the same pur-
pose, positing an "original position" in which all agents are more 
or less equal, and the resulting social contract may be based upon 
the rational decisions of these relatively featureless nascent polit-
ical actors. The social/political world, within this context, thus 
takes the form of a limitation and mediation of the interaction 
between these abstracted individual units. 
Ifwe understand the human agent in terms of an abstract po-
litical unit without any "contingent" historical, social, or psycho-
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logical features, then our understanding of the "self," for any 
given agent, is reduced to what is effectively a mathematical 
point. If what it means to be a political agent is to be capable of 
possessing property, or a bearer of rights, and nothing more, then 
indeed the very notion of political agency is reduced to a kind of 
literal emptiness. To be an agent is simply to be a vessel capable of 
holding or bearing certain important elements. Thus, what dis-
tinguishes one agent from another is merely a matter of the vari-
ous elements which come to fill this vessel. I7 What is more, since 
the self is reduced to this notion of a content-less vessel, it follows 
that all else is external and other. 18 This includes not only those 
things which one may come to possess, but also other agents, as 
well as those historical, political, and psychological features of 
our own which have been deemed irrelevant. Again, reflecting 
upon the basic assumptions of classical contract theory makes 
this point more clearly. In the pre-social "original position" 
(whether it be an actual part of history, as Hobbes seems to sug-
gest, or an hypothetical construct, as with Rawls), the nascent 
political agents exist as individual atoms, working furiously to 
acquire those "goods" needed to satisfy their desires. When at last 
these agents come to realize that their constant competition 
might be doing more harm than good, they begin to engage in 
the exchange of those goods they have acquired. This is the con-
tract. In other words, "I" exist only as a bearer of rights and prop-
erty, and my only means of interaction and relation to other 
agents is through the exchange of those rights and property, 
mediated by an implicit or explicit contract. All of those features 
which serve to distinguish the agent as an individual are pushed 
to the periphery and rendered "external," such that only the 
pure, atomistic political unit remains in the analysis. 
Along with this notion of self as an abstracted individual bear-
er of rights comes a corresponding notion of freedom, and it is 
here that Hegel commences his critique. He states: "The freedom 
of the will, according to this determination, is arbitrariness, in 
which the following two factors are contained: free reflection, 
which abstracts from everything, and dependence on an inward-
ly or externally given content and material."19 The problem with 
this notion of freedom, for Hegel, is that it leads to an idea of 
freedom based upon contingency, and a conception of self based 
upon contradiction.20 This means on one hand that in holding that 
freedom lies in "doing what one pleases" (arbitrariness), it fol-
lows that for any particular action one should take, or thing one 
should claim (as property), that such action or possession should 
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be at any given time purely contingent-it should be the case that 
one can just as easily refute the action, or rid oneself of the 
object. The "free" will, in this sense, is something which has no 
substantive connection to any particular content of willing. In 
other words, in order for any given decision or action to be con-
sidered free in this sense, it must be the case that the content of 
that decision or action be understood as more or less incidental 
and contingent. 
At the same time, this contingency means that for any given 
subject, the content of that subject's will (expressed through ac-
tion) remains fundamentally external. Since the arbitrary content 
is contingent or incidental to the subject as such, a hard distinc-
tion is maintained between the subject and that particular con-
tent of the subject's will. By way of an (rather trivial) example, 
suppose one chooses to wear a certain kind of shoe. But if that 
choice is free, in this sense, then it must be the case that one 
could,just as easily, not so choose. Thus the particular content of 
the decision is rendered contingent. One asserts one's desire to 
wear the shoe, but at the same time asserts that this desire is in no 
way determinate of one's self or in any way limits one's freedom 
(as arbitrariness)-and therein lies the contradiction. For each 
choice-each act of will-requires some determinate, particular 
content. But in order to affirm the contingency of this content, 
one must also posit the particular determination as fundamen-
tally not mine. One may "freely" choose one's shoes, to follow the 
example, but the shoes in no way reflect upon one's identity-the 
choice is thereby contradicted, and rendered "external." The 
contradiction lies in that fact that for each act of willing, which is 
fundamentally an act of affirmation ("/ will this"), there must be 
a corresponding negation ("but this in no way fixes or limits my 
agency"). Each choice or action is thus mine and simultaneously 
not mine. 
This way of understanding freedom and the self, for Hegel, is 
ultimately self defeating. If it is taken to be the case that the stan-
dard for freedom is a content-less, abstracted, atomistic "I," such 
that this subject is free to the degree that it is unfettered by 
"external" boundaries, forces, and compulsions, then it follows 
that any content, any determination of the will, necessarily results 
in a decrease in freedom, since it erects certain boundaries 
around the subject. 21 If the ideal free agent is understood as a rad-
ically undetermined subject with the potential for virtually any 
decision or action, then any actual decision or action must be un-
derstood as at least partially undermining that freedom. That is, 
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every act of will, inasmuch as it requires some determinate con-
tent to the will, contradicts the espoused ideal of a content-less 
subject.22 Thus, Hegel suggests that there is a kind of internal in-
consistency or contradiction lurking behind the notion of free-
dom and the subject which lays the groundwork for contractari-
anlsm. 
The contradictions at the heart of this picture of the subject go 
even deeper, however. The espoused ideal is the radically unde-
termined, content-less subject-the universal, abstracted "I," in 
Hegel's own terminology. Hegel argues that this ideal, iffollowed 
to its logical conclusion, ultimately yields a nonsensical demand 
upon the subject. For the demand to be without determination, is, 
when compared to all forms of determination, in itself a fully 
determined position.23 The injunction to avoid all positive content 
and particularity as contrary to freedom in itself places a clear 
and specific restraint upon the agent-namely, do not will. Just as 
any concrete act of will, any determination or particularity, clos-
es off certain potentialities and possibilities for future action, the 
desire to avoid all determination and particularity effectively clos-
es off, or at least renders odious, all concrete acts of will save one: 
will nothing. But inasmuch as the willing of nothing requires a 
determined stance on the part of the subject, it constitutes an in-
ternal contradiction. 
By way of an admittedly extreme example, imagine a person 
who takes this ideal of freedom to its logical conclusion and holds 
that any determination, since it places restrictions upon her ab-
stracted subjectivity, is contrary to her espoused ideal. She avoids 
any political or social affiliation, since formal group-membership 
usually carries with it certain performative, or at least ideological, 
obligations. Indeed, she may refuse, or at least avoid, most sorts 
of social interaction, since these often lead to feelings of obliga-
tion and commitment, both of which undermine her "integrity" 
as an atomistic individual. She must also avoid appeal or refer-
ence to linguistic, cultural, racial, gender, national, or historical 
background or context, since all of these serve to impose "exter-
nal" expectations and interpretations upon her pure, undeter-
mined subjectivity. And so on. When taken to its logical conclu-
sion, our hypothetical adherent to this view of self and freedom 
must effectively isolate herself from the "outside" world, spend-
ing as much time as possible alone, avoiding any activity which 
might somehow add positive content to her understanding of 
self, and thereby undermine her "freedom." She will, effectively, 
incarcerate herself in order to preserve what she takes to be her 
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liberty. This is the contradiction Hegel sees operating in this un-
derstanding of self and freedom. Seldom do people actually carry 
this notion so far, but we need not stretch our observational 
capacities to find more ordinary manifestations of this paradigm 
all around us. 
Contractarian social and political theories, inasmuch as Hegel 
takes them to rest upon these basic notions of self and freedom, 
are likewise doomed to contradiction. Hegel does not dismiss con-
tract theories outright, however. He takes the emphasis upon indi-
viduality to be an improvement over tradition-bound or theocratic 
forms of political organization. Unlike such traditional autocratic 
social structures, which tend toward the complete dissolution of 
the individual in the larger polity, the advent of modern political 
theory, which emphasizes the freedom of the individual, makes it 
possible for both the individual and the larger polity to more fully 
express themselves. The institution of the contract, focusing as it 
does upon the agent as an individual acting in accordance with his 
or her individual desires, provides the context in which the agent 
is able to develop and express herself as an individual, which in 
turn strengthens and diversifies the polity as a whole.24 
Furthermore, Hegel holds that genuine human agency and 
genuine freedom are a matter of seeing oneself reflected in the 
larger whole, and seeing the larger whole reflected in oneself. 
Thus, rather than understanding the agent as an atomistic bear-
er of rights and property, such that the "external" world stands 
over and against one's understanding of self, Hegel urges us to 
see the social world as the context which renders our agency pos-
sible in the first place.2" Rather than positing self-contained indi-
vidual units which come together to form social structures, he 
thinks of individuals arising through a process of individuation 
from a larger (and in a certain sense logically prior) socialorgan-
ism. What makes one an individual is a matter of the relationship 
one holds to other agents, to larger social institutions, and so on. 
The individualism engendered by contractarian models of social 
interaction, however, fosters an understanding of agency which 
attempts to avoid connection with this larger context, and in so 
doing posits a self which is a featureless abstraction. All particu-
lar features which distinguish a given agent from another come 
to be marginalized as "merely contingent" and ultimately irrele-
vant. In other words, individualism undermines individuality. 
The problems for contract theory arise, according to Hegel, 
when its ideals and modes of understanding are taken too far.26 
The exchange of property and the modes of self-expression and 
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self-development which it engenders ought to be a part of a 
healthy society, but this should be only a relatively minor moment 
in a larger context of cooperation and full participation in insti-
tutions which exist above and beyond the abstracted individual. 
If this moment of individualism and contractual interaction 
comes to be the sole model for understanding human agency and 
social being, then it is hardly an improvement on the traditional 
and autocratic societies it replaced. This contractual moment is 
only constructive, Hegel believes, when it is embedded in a larg-
er social context to which is remains subordinate. A healthy society 
requires well-developed individual agents, but when those indi-
vidual agents become the sole end of social interaction, then not 
only with the larger social whole be adversely impacted, by the 
individual agents themselves will suffer from the crippling of the 
social context within which they are situated. 
One way to flesh-out Hegel's criticism here is by focusing upon 
the way in which contract theory invites a particular way of con-
ceptualizing "the human." Specifically, it is important to look at 
the kinds of symbols it employs to capture and reinforce this par-
ticular view of humanity. Again it is helpful to look at the eco-
nomic model. To be a "consumer" or a "producer" or an "em-
ployer" is a matter of one's ability to assume a particular role in a 
contractual relationship. At the same time, social contract theo-
ry, from Hobbes to Rawls to Gauthier, can in many ways be under-
stood as applying an economic model to the political world. The 
relation between the citizen and the state-the contract in ques-
tion-is a matter of an exchange of certain goods between mutu-
ally consenting (at least hypothetically) parties. I surrender some 
of my natural rights to the state in exchange for security. And just 
as one's status as an economic agent is a matter of one's ability to 
engage in economic transactions, so is one's status as a political 
agent, within the context of social contract theory, a matter of 
one's ability to enter into contractual arrangements. In the end, 
we arrive at a new symbol of the human agent-the "signatory". 
What makes us human is our ability to enter into contracts, since 
human interaction takes place only by means of various implicit 
and explicit contracts. That is, since each political unit exists pri-
marilyas an abstracted bearer of rights and/ or property, it is only 
through an exchange of rights and/or property that these units 
are able to interact. Conversely, those who are not, for whatever 
reason, signatories of the various contracts which govern our be-
havior are outside the bounds humanity itself, in the sense that all 
rights, duties, obligations, and protections are based in the con-
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tract, and those outside of the contract have no rights which gen-
uine or full humans are bound to respect. 27 
It should be possible at this point to see how Hegel's critique 
reflects upon the example provided by the HOA. The basic 
assumptions of contractarianism generate an understanding of 
humanity and human interaction that necessitates the formation 
of formal contracts governing that interaction. If all human inter-
action is ultimately understood as characterized by contractual 
relations, there emerges a drive to spell out contractual relations 
governing all human interactions. It thus becomes necessary to 
formulate concrete rules and restrictions which mediate the in-
teraction of individuals who happen to share adjacent property. 
Once rules and norms for behavior based upon this model begin 
to take hold, they condition one's understanding of self and 
one's place in the larger world such that the original assumptions 
begin to appear true. Given one's role as subject to and an en-
forcer of the CC&R's, one "naturally" begins to behave in a way 
which approximates the ideal agent in the contractarian schema. 
But lurking in the background there is a constant tension. For 
the behavior required within this model, as we have seen, is 
fraught with ironic and often contradictory patterns. In the Or-
wellian world of the HOA, to be a true individual one must erad-
icate individuality. To be free one must be effectively isolated 
from the rest of the world. Human "relationships" are character-
ized by a basic lack of familiarity or intimacy. In short, the preser-
vation of one's integrity as an "agent" requires the mortification 
of one's sense of selfand the crippling of one's ability to take seri-
ously the goals and interests of others on the most basic-most 
human-level. 
And this leads to the heart of Hegel's critique of the social con-
tract. For the symbolism of contractarian social theories fails in 
any but the most superficial of ways to capture the significance of 
what it means to be human. A "signatory" to a contract is a fea-
tureless abstraction. What makes one a signatory is nothing more 
than one's possession of some "good" which can be exchanged 
for some other good. Indeed, contracts are frequently entered 
into by artificial "persons", such as corporations, which exist only 
by virtue of their capacity to "own" assets. That fact that contracts 
hold actual human beings and corporations to be social and mor-
al equals goes a long way toward pointing out exactly why con-
tract theories cannot adequately capture what it means to be hu-
man. The failure of this symbolism is by no means accidental, for 
contractarian theories strip human agents of much of what 
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makes us agents in the first place. Our relationships to other per-
sons, to larger social contexts, and to ourselves as parts of this 
larger context, are all rendered "external" by the notion of the 
contract, and in their place we are left with empty, featureless ves-
sels-bearers of rights and property.28 
The proper response to this failure of contractarian symbols 
and understandings of humanity is not simply some nostalgic re-
turn to "good old days." Rather, if we listen to Hegel, what is 
needed is an effort to preserve what is valuable in contractarian 
thinking, while limiting or expunging its excesses. This purpose 
may be served by a revisiting of older symbols, such as that of the 
"neighbor," but this return to older symbols must never be naive-
ly or uncritically undertaken. Neighborhoods, even in the nor-
mative sense, can be prone to episodes of xenophobia, reaction-
ary isolationism, and naive conformity to tradition and "respect-
ability." A healthy respect for individuality is a welcome respite 
from some of these more odious tendencies. It may be, to main-
tain this particular context, that a return to the symbol of the 
"neighbor" may be just as unsatisfying as the symbol of the "sig-
natory," though surely in different ways. But if we pay attention to 
what was positive in each, what best represented a more critically 
engaged and sophisticated understanding of humanity, we may 
begin to move toward a means of symbolizing the human which 
avoids some of the pitfalls of its predecessors. The first task, and 
most important in the short term, is to draw attention to the fail-
ures of contractarian symbolism, in all of its forms and contexts. 
Its hegemony must be called into question at every turn, but with-
out falling into the trap or outright and naive dismissal. As long 
as its assumptions regarding humanity remain unchallenged, and 
are understood as "human nature," our status as human beings, 
and our relationship to the world around us, will continue to 
worsen. 
In the final passage of Frantz Fanon's Wretched of the Earth, he 
urges us to "turn over a new leaf, [to] work out new concepts, and 
try to set afoot a new man."29 One important part of this monu-
mental task will be exactly the sort of re-symbolizing of the 
human toward which I have gestured here. The "new concepts" 
should bring humanity out from behind the uniform fences and 
well-manicured lawns which preserve the illusion of isolation 
from the rest of the world. Our new symbolism must enable us to 
see and recognize those who have been, and continue to be, 
excluded from our "social contract," not only in our own cities, 
but in every corner of the globe. Inasmuch as the atomistic sym-
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bolism of the social contract serves to obfuscate the reality of 
human misery and oppression, and our own role in the mainte-
nance of that oppression, an important task will be the transcen-
dence of that symbolism, and the setting afoot of a new under-
standing of human being. 
NOTES 
II would certainly include what has come to be known as "neoliberalism" in 
this tradition, though it has come to have far less in common with the classical 
theories of Smith than many of its proponents would have us believe. 
2See Herman E. Daly and John B. Cobb, Jr., For the Common Good, Beacon 
Press, Boston, 1989, pp. 85-96 
'Smith, Adam, Wealth of Nations" Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1880 
4Hobbes, Thomas, Leviathan-Parts I and II, Macmillan Publishing Company, 
New York, 1985 p. 112 
"By way of a quick example, many Home-Owners Associations (HOA's) not only 
devote resources to the upkeep of the physical grounds of the "common" proper-
ty (clubhouses, streets, swimming pools, exercise facilities), but also employ private 
security--empowered not only to maintain a perimeter through which only resi-
dents and their guests may pass, but also to assess fines for speeding, disorderliness, 
etc. In effect, this sets up a community which is technically part of a larger city, but 
which has little need for city services. Thus, they are relatively isolated and pro-
tected from the problems of the city, and this no doubt affects their voting patterns 
and their understanding of how the city's resources should be allocated. Returning 
to Las Vegas, virtually all new housing is part of a system of HOA's, which means 
that those who are able to afford property in these new developments, and there-
fore a large part of the city's tax base, are less and less interested in supporting vital 
services. Thus there are huge and affluent Master-Planned Communities to the 
Northwest and Southeast of Vegas with private security and well-maintained 
streets, while the city itself is finding it very difficult to address the problems of 
public education, homelessness, crime, and transportation 
"Gordon, Lewis, Existentia Africana, Routledge, New York, 2000, p. 73 
"This is in many ways limited to HOA's established in new housing develop-
ments. There are HOA's for example, established to preserve historical neigh-
borhoods, which generates rules and a dynamic of interaction between the 
home-owners which are in certain ways importantly different from my examples. 
There is no enforcement of homogeneity, for example. Again, what is important 
is not the universality (or lack thereof) of my description of HOA's, but rather 
the general approach toward humanity that this description embodies. 
"Of course, it is best if the yard work is hired out, rather than performed by 
the actual home owner. HOA's will often arrange to provide discounts to mem-
bers through a particular company. What is interesting about this, and related 
to this investigation, is the racial dynamic of this practice. Ifwe think of the kind 
of "invisibility" often associated with the presence of non-whites, and the fact 
that grounds-keeping is a kind of labor often performed by non-whites, then 
having one's yard-work contracted out in this way is a means of ensuring that 
nobody will "see" it being done. 
'Once it is decided that a given family is "trouble", they are of course afford-
ed special attention by those around them, and are thereby liable to be cited for 
134/MONAHAN 
further violations of the CC&R's. The family in the above example experienced 
exactly this sort of scrutiny, and were found in violation of some regulation or 
other nearly every month. Within a year after moving in, this family left. It is not 
known for certain, but is probably a safe guess that their move was at least in 
part motivated by the constant harassment of the HOA. 
lIIAs online shopping becomes more simple, and more popular, we can see 
how this effective isolation is becoming more and more complete. At present, it 
becomes necessary, upon occasion, to interact with others, but technology will 
soon make that interaction strictly optional. 
IIThis requirement often holds even in the deserts of Nevada and Arizona, 
which obviously requires massive depletion of water resources. This alone 
speaks volumes about the kind of relations HOA's establish with those who are 
outside of the Association proper. The needs of the larger polity are clearly sec-
ondary to the demands of property value. 
I'For information on restrictive covenants, including extensive references, 
consult the following online resources: 
http://tigger.uic.edu/-wplotkl/deeds/ 
http://faculty.econ.northwestern.edu/faculty/ferrie/wksp/covenant.pdf 
http://www.lihistory.com/specsec/hslevrac.htm 
I"For extended discussion of the continuing segregation in the U.S., see 
Hacker, Andrew, Two Nations, Ballantine Books, New York, 1992; and Massey, 
Douglas S., and Denton, Nancy A., American Apartheid, Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, Mass., 1993 
14This list would include Marx, and thus all Marxists, at least indirectly, and 
also Sartre, as well as Dewey, and through him, Rorty. 
15Hegel, G. W. F., Elements of the Philosophy of Right, Cambridge University 
Press, 1991 
lfiHegel, Philosophy of Right, sections 33-34 
17ibid., section 104 
IHibid., section 39 
I"ibid., section 15 
2(libid. 
'IWorking in this model, it could certainly be the case that the aggregate free-
dom could be increased by a given choice or action. By choosing to escape from 
a cell, for instance, one could be understood as increasing one's freedom. But 
this misses the point. Even the decision to escape from incarceration must close 
off some possibility for decision or action (in this case, the decision to remain 
incarcerated), and this fact alone is sufficient for Hegel's purposes. 
"Philosophy of Right, section 4 
"ibid., section 34 
"ibid., sections 182-187 
"ibid., section 33 
'fiibid., section 75 
"For more on this exclusionary phenomenon in social contract theories, see 
Carol Pateman's The Sexual Contract (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988) 
and Charles Mills' The Racial Contract (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997). 
'HIn the end, the only means we are left by which to correct this omission is 
by attempting, as best as we are able, to fill this vessel with as much "goods" as 
we can. Thus, one may make a strong case that consumerism is directly related 
to the rise of the contractarian understanding of self and the social world. 
'"Fanon, Frantz, The Wretched of the Earth, Grove Press, New York, 1963, p. 316. 
The Person as Signatory/135 
